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  Cross	  border	  practice	  produces	   inevitable	  questions	   of	   choice	  of	   law	   regarding	   governing	   lawyer	   ethics	   codes.	   	   Inevitably,	  norms	  of	  lawyer	  conduct	  vary	  from	  state	  to	  state	  and	  continent	  to	  continent.	   	  Uncertainty	  about	  norms	  of	  conduct	  pervades	   lawyer	  to	   lawyer	   interactions	   in	   cross	   border	   contexts.	   	   Undoubtedly,	  greater	   uniformity	   of	   rules	   and	   standards	   would	   produce	   some	  benefits.	   	   But	   such	   uniformity	   of	   rules	   would	   likely	   produce	  illusory	  uniformity	  given	  cultural	  differences.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  such	  uniformity	   could	   occur	   and	   would	   be	   beneficial,	   the	   model	   of	  lawyer	   regulation	   and	   conduct	   should	   not	   be	   the	   U.S.	   model,	  despite	  recent	  initiatives	  to	  export	  U.S.-­‐style	  lawyer	  ethics	  models	  to	  emerging	  democracies	  and	  developing	  states.	  
INTRODUCTION	  Over	  the	  past	  decade	  or	  so,	  a	  massive	  exportation	  of	  U.S.	  lawyer	  ethics	   law	   has	   been	   taking	   place.	   	   The	   exportation	   has	   been	  managed	   largely,	   but	   not	   exclusively	   by	   ABA	   Rule	   of	   Law	  programs,	   funded	   extensively	   by	   grants	   from	   USAID.1	   	   I	   have	  	   * Vincent	  Bradford	  Professor	  of	  Law	  at	  Washington	  &	  Lee	  University.	   	  Thanks	   to	  Amelia	   Guckenberg,	   Lethia	   Hammond	   and	   Jon	   Burtard	   for	   excellent	   research	  assistance	  and	  to	  my	  many	  international	  partners.	  	  This	  paper	  was	  first	  presented	  at	  a	   symposium	   at	   the	   University	   of	   London’s	   Institute	   of	   Advanced	   Legal	   Studies,	  “Regulating	  and	  Deregulating	  Lawyers	  in	  the	  21st	  Century,”	  June	  3,	  2010.	  1 See	   Rule	   of	   Law	   Initiative,	   AMERICAN	   BAR	   ASSOCIATION	   http://apps.americanbar	  .org/rol/	  (last	  visited	  May	  18,	  2011).	  
48	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  47	  participated	   in	  several	  of	   these	  projects.	   	  Many	  dedicated	  people	  do	   excellent	   work	   in	   these	   projects	   and	   nothing	   in	   this	   essay	  should	   be	   read	   to	   suggest	   that	   these	   projects	   lack	   value.	   	   But	  because	   they	   are	   exporting	  U.S.-­‐style	   lawyer	   ethics	   regulation,	   a	  system	  that	  is	  a	  poor	  fit	  with	  legal	  cultures	  outside	  the	  U.S.,	  some	  of	   the	   work	   harms	   the	   goal	   of	   enhancing	   uniformity	   in	   lawyer	  conduct	  and	  regulation.	  In	  Tbilisi,	  Georgia,	  during	  a	  March	  2011	  trip	  to	  do	  lawyer	  ethics	  training,	   I	   followed-­‐up	   on	   a	   story	   I	   had	   heard	   on	   a	   previous	  training	   trip:	   the	   new	   judicial	   ethics	   law,	   modeled	   on	   the	   ABA	  Model	   Code	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct,	   has	   been	   used	   as	   a	   tool	   of	  government	  control	  over	  the	  judiciary.	  	  As	  well,	  the	  institution	  of	  plea	  bargaining	  has	  resulted	  in	  serious	  abuse	  of	  criminal	  defense	  lawyers.	   	   A	   tool	   of	   criminal	   case	   processing	   efficiency	   in	   the	  United	  States	  is	  a	  tool	  of	  government	  abuse	  of	  defense	  lawyers	  in	  Georgia	  because	   the	   local	  power	  of	  prosecution	  offices	   is	  greatly	  out	   of	   proportion	   to	   the	   power	   of	   the	   private	   bar.2	   	   This	   is	  certainly	   not	   the	   result	   that	   was	   desired	   or	   anticipated	   by	   the	  advocates	   of	   the	   new	   judicial	   code	   or	   of	   the	   plea	   bargaining	  institution.	   	  But	  when	   too	   little	  attention	   is	  paid	   to	   local	   culture,	  mere	  adoption	  of	  excellent	  words	  and	  efficient	  practices	  can	  have	  deleterious	  results.	  The	   large-­‐scale	   adoption	   of	   U.S.	   models	   of	   lawyer	   and	   judge	  regulation	   outside	   the	   United	   States	   is	   likely	   to	   produce	  unfortunate	  results.	  	  The	  U.S.	  lawyer	  regulation	  system	  has	  much	  to	   recommend	   it,	   but	   it	   also	   has	   serious	   flaws,	   and	   more	  importantly	   for	   this	   purpose,	   it	   has	   no	   real	   relationship	   with	  lawyer	  culture	  outside	  the	  U.S.	  
I	  
THE	  EXPORTATION	  The	   exportation	   of	   U.S.	   legal	   ethics	  models	   has	   proceeded	   on	  many	  fronts,	  but	  the	  ABA	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Initiative	  (ROLI)	  has	  carried	  much	  of	   the	   load.	   	  These	  projects	  have	  had	  enormous	  success	  at	  establishing	   ABA-­‐like	   lawyer	   associations,	   proposing	   and	  shepherding	   the	   adoption	   of	   ABA-­‐like	   lawyer	   and	   judge	   ethics	  codes,	   and	   introducing	   U.S.-­‐style	   dispute	   resolution	  models	   that	  carry	  lawyer	  ethics	  implications.	  The	   Bangalore	   Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct	   are	   one	   notable	  exception	  to	  the	  U.S.	  model	  adoptions.	   	  The	  Bangalore	  Principles	  represent	   a	   genuinely	   international	   amalgam,	   having	   been	  	   2 Letter	  from	  Council	  of	  the	  Bars	  and	  Law	  Societies	  of	  Europe	  (CCBE)	  to	  Georgian	  President	  Mikheil	  Saakashvili	  (December	  21,	  2010)	  (on	  file	  with	  author).	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  adopted	  by	  a	  diverse	  group.	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  ABA	  Model	  Code	  of	  Judicial	  Conduct	  and	  numerous	  U.S.	  state	  codes	  of	  judicial	  conduct	  figured	   prominently	   in	   the	   group’s	   design	   work.	   	   It	   is	   also	   true	  that	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   are	   very	   broad	   in	   nature	   and	  represent	   less	  a	  code	  of	   judicial	   conduct	   than	  a	  statement	  of	   the	  key	   attributes	   of	   a	   successful	   judicial	   system,	   for	   example	  independence,	  impartiality,	  and	  the	  like.3	  	  As	  a	  broad	  statement	  of	  attributes,	   the	   Bangalore	   document	   has	   been	   advanced	   by	   the	  ABA	  and	   its	  adoption	   in	  a	  given	  country	  would	  not	  preclude	   the	  adoption	  of	  more	  detailed	  U.S.-­‐like	  codes	  of	  judicial	  conduct.	  Some	  of	  the	  ABA	  successes	  have	  occurred	  in	  Albania,	  Armenia,	  Georgia,	  Kazakhstan,	  Kosovo,	  Kyrgyzstan,	  Bulgaria,	  Romania,	  and	  Jordan.4	  Occasionally,	   the	   U.S.	   system	   loses	   a	   contest	   for	   adoption,	  usually	   to	   a	   Western	   European	   NGO	   competitor.	   	   For	   example,	  The	   Republic	   of	   Kosovo	   is	   currently	   experiencing	   a	   watershed	  moment	   in	   the	   history	   of	   its	   judicial	   sector	   and,	   under	   the	  guidance	  of	  numerous	  American	  NGOs	  and	  attorneys,	  has	  adopted	  many	   lawyer	   regulations	   modeled	   after	   the	   U.S.	   system.	  	  Nevertheless,	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   this	   transformation,	   the	   Kosovo	  General	   Assembly	   established	   a	   notary	   regime	   based	   on	   the	  European	   civil	   law	  model.	   	   Unlike	   notaries	   public	   in	   the	   United	  States,	  notaries	  in	  Kosovo	  will	  be	  government-­‐licensed	  attorneys	  responsible	   for	   drafting	   legally	   enforceable	   contracts	   and	  providing	  legal	  advice	  to	  private	  parties,	  as	  they	  are	  in	  France	  and	  other	  French	  code-­‐based	  civil	  law	  countries.5	  Exceptions	  aside,	  the	  U.S.	  lawyer	  ethics	  and	  regulation	  model	  is	  experiencing	  enormous	  success	  in	  emerging	  democracies	  abroad.	  
II	  
THE	  NEED	  FOR	  HARMONIZATION	  Without	   doubt,	   there	   are	   advantages	   to	   having	   a	   consistent,	  worldwide	   system	   of	   lawyer	   regulation.6	   	   Imagine	   a	   simple	  situation,	   some	   form	   of	   which	   is	   occurring	   all	   the	   time:	   a	   U.S.	  corporation	   is	   in	   a	   dispute	   with	   an	   Italian	   one.	   	   Both	   the	   U.S.	  	   3 THE	  BANGALORE	  PRINCIPLES	   OF	   JUDICIAL	   CONDUCT	   (2002)	   (adopted,	   Judicial	   Group	  on	   Strengthening	   Judicial	   Integrity;	   revised,	   Round	   Table	  Meeting	   of	   Chief	   Justices	  2002),	  available	  at	  http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/Bangalore_principles.pdf.	  4 For	  some	  details	  on	  each	  project	  and	  its	  exportation	  of	  US	  models	  of	  lawyer	  and	  judicial	  ethics,	  see	  James	  E.	  Moliterno,	  Exporting	  American	  Legal	  Ethics,	  43	  AKRON	  L.	  REV.	  769,	  771-­‐75	  (2010).	  5 See	  Law	  on	  Notary,	  Republic	  of	  Kosovo,	  no.	  03/L-­‐10	  (adopted	  Oct.	  17,	  2008).	  6 See,	  e.g.,	  Lawton	  P.	  Cummings,	  Globalization	  and	  the	  Evisceration	  of	  the	  Corporate	  
Attorney-­‐Client	   Privilege:	   A	   Re-­‐Examination	   of	   the	   Privilege	   and	   a	   Proposal	   for	  
Harmonization,	  76	  TENN.	  L.	  REV.	  1	  (2008).	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  lawyer	  and	  her	  Italian	  opponent	  are	  investigating	  fact	  issues	  that	  underlie	   the	   dispute.	   	   Each	   wants	   to	   speak	   with	   a	   former	  employee	   of	   the	   Italian	   corporation.	   	   The	   former	   employee	  now	  lives	  in	  Germany.	  	  As	  the	  two	  lawyers	  fly	  from	  their	  home	  cities	  to	  Munich,	   each	   wonders	   what	   lawyer	   ethics	   rules	   apply	   to	   their	  hoped-­‐for	   contact	  with	   the	   former	   employee.	   	   Is	   the	  U.S.	   lawyer	  bound	  by	  her	   state’s	   ethics	   code?	   	  By	   Italian	  ethics	   law?	   	  By	   the	  CCBE	   code?	   	   By	   German	   ethics	   law?	   	   And	   what	   should	   the	   U.S.	  lawyer	   anticipate	   about	   the	   Italian	   lawyer’s	   actions?	   	   By	   what	  ethics	  law	  is	  the	  Italian	  lawyer	  governed?	  It	  would	  be	  a	  good	  thing	  if	  they	  could	  be	  relieved	  of	  researching	  such	   an	   issue	   and	   be	   comforted	   to	   know	   that	   the	   same	  witness	  contact	  rules	  apply	  to	  both	  lawyers.	  	  Currently	  that	  is	  not	  the	  case	  and	  it	  is	  no	  answer	  to	  say	  they	  can	  agree	  to	  what	  law	  will	  apply,	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  contract	  term.	  	  The	  public	  interest	  in	  lawyer	  regulation	  does	  not	  permit	  a	  lawyer	  to	  negotiate	  away	  her	  obligations	  under	  the	  applicable	  lawyer	  ethics	  law.7	  A	   uniform	   set	   of	   lawyer	   ethics	   rules	   would	   no	   doubt	   have	  advantages	   for	   the	   conduct	   of	   lawyer	   business	   and	   the	   free	  movement	  of	  legal	  services.8	  	  Cross-­‐border	  practice	  and	  licensure	  would	  be	  simplified.	  Having	  uniform	  rules	  requires	  more	  than	  having	  uniformity	  of	  words	   in	   governing	   rules.	   	   There	   is	   an	   illusory	   harmonization	  when	   the	  words	  of	   the	  governing	   legal	   rules	  are	   similar,	  but	   the	  underlying	   legal	   culture	   is	  quite	  different.	   	  Words	   in	   rules	  mean	  what	   they	   mean	   in	   the	   culture	   and	   society	   that	   adopted	   those	  words,	   and	   in	   the	   case	   of	   lawyer	   ethics	   rules,	   the	   culture	   of	   the	  lawyers	  to	  whom	  the	  words	  will	  apply.	  Adoption	  of	  U.S.	   forms	  of	   lawyer	  and	  judge	  regulation	  will	  not	  make	   the	   world’s	   lawyers	   more	   like	   U.S.	   lawyers.	   	   They	   do	   not	  function	  in	  the	  U.S.	  culture	  and	  are	  not	  educated	  as	  common	  law	  lawyers.9	   	   The	   legal	   systems	  within	  which	   they	   function	   are	   not	  like	  U.S.	  systems.	  	   7 See	   RESTATEMENT	   (THIRD)	   OF	   THE	   LAW	   GOVERNING	   LAWYERS	   §	   1	   cmt.	   e	   (2000).	  “Choice	  of	   law	  in	   lawyer	  regulation.	   	   In	  general,	   traditional	  choice-­‐of-­‐law	  principles,	  such	  as	   those	  set	  out	   in	   the	  Restatement	  Second	  of	  Conflict	  of	  Laws,	  have	  governed	  questions	  of	  choice	  of	  law	  in	  nondisciplinary	  litigation	  involving	  lawyers.”	  Id.	  §	  5	  cmt.	  h	  (2000)	  (emphasis	  added)	  (regarding	  choice	  of	  law	  in	  disciplinary	  matters).	  8 See	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Trade	  in	  Services	  (GATS),	  Apr.	  15,	  1994,	  1869	  U.N.T.S.	  183;	  Laurel	  S.	  Terry,	  GATS’	  Applicability	  to	  Transnational	  Lawyering	  and	  its	  Potential	  
Impact	   on	   U.S.	   State	   Regulation	   of	   Lawyers,	   34	   VAND.	   J.	   TRANSNAT’L	   L.	   989	   (2001);	  Laurel	   S.	   Terry,	   From	   GATS	   to	   APEC:	   The	   Impact	   of	   Trade	   Agreements	   on	   Legal	  
Services,	  43	  AKRON	  L.	  REV.	  875	  (2010).	  9 Even	  this	  goal	  seems	  sometimes	  within	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  U.S.	  NGOs.	   	  In	  Armenia,	  the	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  has	  begun	  to	  operate	  as	  a	  common	  law	  court	  pursuant	  to	  a	  law	  adopted	   in	   2005.	   	  See	  Republic	   of	   Armenia	   Judicial	   Code,	   §	   1,	   Art.	   15,	   cl.	   4	   (2007),	  
 
2011]	   Modeling	  the	  American	  Lawyer	  Regulation	  System	   51	  Planting	  U.S.	  lawyer	  ethics	  rules	  in	  places	  as	  different	  from	  the	  United	   States	   as	   Kosovo,	   the	   Republic	   of	   Georgia,	   Thailand,	  Kazakhstan,	  and	  Jordan	  is	  sure	  to	  create	  unwanted	  results.	   	  Each	  of	  these	  nations	  has	  its	  own	  winding	  path	  of	  legal	  culture,	  leading	  to	   a	   present	   existence.	   	   None	   of	   them	   have	   the	   common	   law	  tradition.	   	  None	  of	  them	  have	  long	  histories	  of	  democracy.	   	  None	  of	  them	  have	  traditions	  of	  private	  lawyers	  as	  checks	  on	  the	  power	  of	   government.	   	   The	   English	   words	   of	   the	   U.S.-­‐style	   code	   mean	  what	  they	  mean	  in	  Georgia,	  Thailand,	  and	  Kosovo,	  not	  what	  they	  mean	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Even	   the	   ABA	   Model	   Rules,	   which	   do	   their	   best	   to	   make	   all	  lawyers	   look	   alike,	   acknowledge	   this	   culture-­‐driven	   meaning	  shift.	   	   Model	   Rule	   4.1,	   dealing	   with	   materially	   false	   lawyer	  statements	  of	   fact,	   is	  often	  at	  play	   in	  negotiation	  conduct.10	   	  The	  Comments	  to	  4.1	  themselves	  acknowledge	  the	  local	  nature	  of	  this	  rule’s	  interpretation:	  it	  defines	  the	  conduct	  that	  is	  permissible	  in	  negotiation	  by	  reference	  to	  local	  norms	  of	  negotiation	  behavior.	  11	  	  If	   the	   same	   words	   mean	   something	   different	   in	   New	   York	   and	  Omaha,	  they	  surely	  mean	  something	  different	  between	  New	  York	  or	  Omaha	  and	  Tbilisi	  or	  Pristine.	  
III	  
THE	  PRICE	  OF	  UNIFORMITY	  Even	  if	  genuine	  uniformity	  were	  possible,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  price	   to	   be	   paid	   for	   uniformity.	   	   To	   have	   a	   uniform	   rule,	   some	  choice	  must	  be	  made	  among	  the	  options.	  	  Will	  some	  existing	  rule	  be	   best?	   	   Or	   perhaps	   some	   amalgamation	   of	   the	   differing	   rules?	  Uniformity	  itself	  assumes	  that	  “one	  size	  fits	  all.”	  	  That	  size	  should	  not	  be	  the	  U.S.	  size.	  
	  “The	   reasoning	   of	   a	   judicial	   act	   of	   the	   Cassation	   Court	   or	   the	   European	   Court	   of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  a	  case	  with	  certain	  factual	  circumstances	  (including	  the	  construal	  of	  the	   law)	   is	   binding	   on	   a	   court	   in	   the	   examination	   of	   a	   case	   with	   identical/similar	  factual	  circumstances,	  unless	  the	  latter	  court,	  by	  indicating	  solid	  arguments,	  justifies	  that	  such	  reasoning	  is	  not	  applicable	  to	  the	  factual	  circumstances	  at	  hand.”	  (citation	  omitted).	   	   Armenia	   has	   a	   court	   system	   of	   general	   jurisdiction	   consisting	   of	   sixteen	  Courts	   of	   First	   Instance	   and	   the	   Court	   of	   Cassation.	   	   See	  The	   Judiciary	   of	   Armenia,	  http://www.court.am/?l=en&mode;	   ARMENIA	   CONST.	   arts.	   92,	   100;	   Republic	   of	  Armenia	   Judicial	   Code,	   §	  1,	   art.	   III	   (2007).	   	  Decisions	  by	   the	  Court	   of	   Cassation	   are	  immediately	   binding	   and	   non-­‐appealable.	   	   See	   id.	   	   Armenia	   also	   has	   specialized	  Administrative,	   Civil,	   and	   Criminal	   courts,	   as	   well	   as	   Civil	   and	   Criminal	   Courts	   of	  Appeals.	  	  Id.	  10 MODEL	  RULES	  OF	  PROF’L	  CONDUCT	  R.	  4.1,	   cmt.	  2	   (2004).	   	  The	  Comment	  refers	   to	  “generally	  accepted	  conventions	  in	  negotiation,”	  which	  inevitably	  vary	  from	  one	  legal	  community	  to	  another.	  11 Id.	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  47	  U.S.	  rules	  might	  be	  the	  choice	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  adopted	  because	  of	  U.S.	  strength	  and	  influence,	  but	  this	  model	  seems	  unlikely	  to	  be	  a	   successful	   fit.	   	   The	   U.S.	   lawyer	   is	   actually	   quite	   unique	   in	   the	  world.	  	  As	  a	  common	  law	  lawyer,	  she	  perceives	  herself,	  correctly,	  as	  a	  lawmaker.12	  	  She	  makes	  arguments	  to	  courts	  that	  become	  law	  when	   agreed	   with	   by	   a	   judge.	   	   Civil	   law	   lawyers	   have	   a	   quite	  different	  sense	  of	  themselves.	  	  They,	  and	  the	  judges	  to	  whom	  they	  argue,	  are	  law	  appliers,	  not	  lawmakers	  (except	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  civil	  law	  lawyer	  might	  become	  a	  member	  of	  parliament).	  	  Without	  the	  effect	  of	  their	  victory	  in	  litigation	  establishing	  precedent,	  civil	  law	   lawyers	   lack	   the	   sense	   of	   connection	   between	   their	   court-­‐work	   and	   changes	   in	   the	   law:	   a	   connection	   that	   is	   embedded	   in	  the	  psyche	  of	  common	  law	  lawyers.	  The	  dispute	   resolution	   system	   itself	   is	   quite	   different	   in	  well-­‐known	   ways,	   driving	   substantial	   differences	   in	   lawyer	   role.	   In	  most	   civil	   law	   systems,	   the	   lawyers	   do	   not	   formally	   present	  evidence	  to	  a	  court.	   	  The	  judge	  investigates	  a	  matter	  and	  forms	  a	  dossier	   of	   witness	   statements	   and	   other	   evidentiary	   material.	  	  The	  lawyers	  have	  less,	  and	  sometimes	  no,	  contact	  with	  witnesses,	  and	  certainly	  less	  evidence-­‐related	  responsibility	  in	  hearings.13	  In	  various	  surface	  ways,	  the	  U.S.	  model	  is	  quite	  unlike	  any	  other	  and	   would	   require	   remarkable	   adjustments	   to	   legal	   systems	  outside	  the	  United	  States	  to	  make	  sense.	  Rules	   regarding	   advertising	   and	   solicitation14	   are	   framed	  differently	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   not	   because	   of	   the	   bar’s	  preferences,15	   but	   because	   of	   the	   First	   Amendment’s	   limitations	  on	  the	  bar’s	  power.16	  	  Such	  a	  robust	  speech	  freedom	  is	  rare.17	  The	   beginning	   of	   the	   lawyer-­‐client	   relationship	   is	   far	   more	  formal	  than	  in	  the	  United	  States.18	  	  Outside	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  	   12 GEOFFREY	  C.	  HAZARD	  JR.	  &	  ANGELO	  DONDI,	  LEGAL	  ETHICS:	  A	  COMPARATIVE	  STUDY	  68–69	  (2004);	  JOHN	  HENRY	  MERRYMAN	  &	  ROGELIO	  PÉREZ-­‐PERDOMO,	  THE	  CIVIL	  LAW	  TRADITION	  23–24,	  34–38,	  109–10	  (3d	  ed.	  2007);	  KONRAD	  ZWEIGERT	  &	  HEIN	  KÖTZ,	  AN	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  COMPARATIVE	  LAW	  69–71	  (Tony	  Weir	  trans.,	  3d	  ed.	  1998);	  RENÉ	  DAVID,	  FRENCH	  LAW:	  ITS	  STRUCTURE,	  SOURCES,	  AND	  METHODOLOGY	  56–57,	  63	  (Michael	  Kindred	  trans.,	  1972);	  F.H.	  LAWSON,	  A	  COMMON	  LAWYER	  LOOKS	  AT	  THE	  CIVIL	  LAW	  65–83	  (1953).	  13 HAZARD	  &	  DONDI,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  67.	  14 MODEL	  RULES	  OF	  PROF’L	  CONDUCT	  R.	  7.1–7.5.	  15 Compare	  MODEL	  RULES	  OF	  PROF’L	  CONDUCT	  R.	  7.1–7.5	  with	  MODEL	  CODE	  OF	  PROF’L	  RESPONSIBILITY	   DR	   2-­‐101	   et	   seq,	   the	   latter	   of	   which	   predated	   Supreme	   Court	  application	  of	  the	  First	  Amendment	  to	  a	  lawyer’s	  commercial	  speech.	  16 See,	  e.g.,	  Bates	  v.	  Arizona	  State	  Bar	  Assoc.,	  433	  U.S.	  350	  (1977).	  17 HAZARD	  &	  DONDI,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  143.	  18 Outside	   the	   U.S.,	   lawyers	   speak	   of	   “receiving	   instructions”	   from	   their	   clients,	  which	  essentially	  begins	  the	  lawyer-­‐client	  relationship.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  European	  E-­‐Justice	  Portal,	   Fees	   available	   at	   https://e-­‐justice.europa.eu/contentPresentation.do?lang	  =en&idCountry=at&idTaxonomy=37&member=1&vmac=0Zlwi8__R8HVrZ44WgbkDIFlm4CIUjRf2kblo5qZ8l1d4ZVH20YKrC1S2sqObMNU150Jj8pmynW8iMUXjs3H4gAAG
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  concept	   of	   beginning	   the	   lawyer-­‐client	   relationship	   involves	   the	  client	   “giving	   instructions”	   to	   the	   lawyer.	   	   The	   concept	   in	   the	  United	  States	  is	  far	  more	  fluid.19	  Conflicts	   of	   interest	   (incompatible	   relations)	   discussions	  outside	  the	  U.S.	  focus	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  multiple	  client	  issues,	  while	   other	   competing	   interests	   are	   discussed	  more	   in	   terms	   of	  priorities	   and	   lawyer	   independence.	   	   Lawyers’	   independence	  from	   the	   state	   is	   less	   pronounced	   outside	   the	   United	   States;	  lawyers’	   independence	   from	   the	   client	   is	   more	   pronounced	  outside	  the	  United	  States.	  More	   fundamentally,	   the	   U.S.	   system	   of	   lawyer	   regulation	  persists	   in	   isolating	   lawyers	   from	   partnership	   relations	   with	  nonlawyers20	  while	  these	  barriers	  are	  being	  broken	  down	  in	  large	  and	  small	  ways	  elsewhere.21	  	  Efforts	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  break	  down	  those	  restrictions	  have	  failed,	  and	  failed	  again.	  	  In	  the	  early	  1980s,	   the	   concept	   was	   known	   as	   “ancillary	   business,”22	   and	   it	  failed	  in	  the	  famous	  “fear	  of	  Sears”	  vote.23	  	  When	  the	  Reporter	  for	  the	   proposed	   amendments	   to	   the	   ABA	  model	   code	  was	   asked	   if	  this	  particular	  amendment	  would	  permit	  Sears	  to	  open	  a	  law	  firm,	  he	   candidly	   said,	   “yes.”	   	   The	   measure	   was	   roundly	   defeated.24	  	  	  GMAAALP	   (“In	   this	   regard,	   section	   50(2)	   of	   the	   Richtlinien	   für	   die	   Ausübung	   des	  Rechtsanwaltsberufs	   und	   für	   die	   Überwachung	   der	   Pflichten	   des	   Rechtsanwalts	  [Guidelines	   on	   the	   Exercise	   of	   the	   Profession	   of	   Lawyer	   and	   the	   Supervision	   of	  Lawyers’	   Obligations]	   (RL-­‐BA)	   recommends	   that,	  when	   receiving	   instructions	   on	   a	  
new	  matter,	  the	  lawyer	  should	  inform	  the	  client	  of	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  the	  fee	  will	  be	  charged	  and	  of	  his	  or	  her	  entitlement	  to	  an	  interim	  payment.”)	  (emphasis	  added).	  19 See,	  e.g.,	  Togstad	  v.	  Vesely,	  291	  N.W.2d	  686	  (Minn.	  1980).	  20 MODEL	   RULES	   OF	   PROF’L	   CONDUCT	   R.	   5.4	   (prohibiting	   lawyers	   from	   sharing	   fees	  with	  nonlawyers,	  effectively	  preventing	  lawyer	  partnerships	  with	  nonlawyers).	  21 European	  nations	  have	  been	  more	  willing	  to	  embrace	  multidisciplinary	  practice.	  	  
See	   Legal	   Services	   Act	   (Tesco	   Law),	   2007,	   (U.K.)	   (allowing	   British	   lawyers	   to	   both	  form	   partnerships	  with	   nonlawyers	   and	   also	   operate	   under	   external	   ownership	   or	  with	   outside	   investment);	   John	   S.	  Dzienkowski	  &	  Robert	   J.	   Peroni,	  Multidisciplinary	  
Practice	   and	   the	   American	   Legal	   Profession:	   A	   Market	   Approach	   to	   Regulating	   the	  
Delivery	   of	   Legal	   Services	   in	   the	   Twenty-­‐First	   Century,	   69	   FORDHAM	   L.	   REV.	   83,	   113	  (2000)	  (noting	  that	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  MDP	  are	  in	  post-­‐war	  Germany,	  where	  lawyers	  and	   tax	   accountants	   have	   been	   able	   to	   practice	   together	   in	   a	   partnership	   since	   the	  end	   of	  World	  War	   II);	   Laurel	   S.	   Terry,	  The	  European	  Commission	  Project	   Regarding	  
Competition	  in	  Professional	  Services,	  29	  NW.	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  &	  BUS.	  1,	  19	  (2009)	  (explaining	  that	   the	   Netherlands	   Bar	   Association’s	   regulations	   allow	   for	   lawyers	   to	   become	  partners	  with	  notaries	  and	  tax	  advisors,	  but	  not	  with	  auditors).	  22 See	   MODEL	   RULES	   OF	   PROF’L	   CONDUCT	   R.	   5.7	   (allowing	   a	   scaled	   back,	   modest	  version	   of	   ancillary	   businesses	   conditioned	   on	   all	   participants	   obeying	   the	   lawyer	  ethics	  rules).	  23 See	   Edward	   S.	   Adams	   &	   John	   H.	   Matheson,	   Law	   Firms	   on	   the	   Big	   Board?:	   A	  
Proposal	   for	   Nonlawyer	   Investment	   in	   Law	   Firms,	   86	   CAL.	   L.	   REV.	   1,	   10–11	   (1998)	  (discussing	   the	   debate	   over	   proposed	   Model	   Rule	   5.4,	   which	   would	   have	   allowed	  lawyers	  to	  form	  business	  associations	  with	  nonlawyers).	  24 Id.	  at	  11.	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  47	  After	   a	   decade	  of	   informal	   inroads,	  most	  mass	  hiring	   of	   lawyers	  by	   accounting	   firms	   to	   do	   so-­‐called	   “consulting,”25	   the	   move	   to	  permit	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  practice	   (MDPs)	  was	   gaining	   ground.26	  	  Then	   Enron	   and	   the	   connection	   made	   between	   its	   officers’	  defalcations	   and	   the	   relationships	   between	   lawyers	   and	  accountants	   within	   Arthur	   Anderson	   produced	   a	   powerful	  rejection	  of	  MDPs27	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Sarbanes-­‐Oxley	  Act,28	  effectively	   killing	   any	   talk	   of	   MDPs	   for	   almost	   another	   decade.	  	  The	   talk	  has	  returned,	  as	  a	  proposal	   for	  new	  business	  models	   to	  replace	  the	  old	  in	  the	  late	  2000s	  economic	  crisis29	  and	  questions	  about	   the	   future	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   traditional	   law	   firm	  model.30	  In	   short,	   for	   the	   U.S.	   system	   to	   actually	   fit	   well	   in	   most	  emerging	   democracies,	   enormous	   social,	   cultural,	   and	   justice	  system	  changes	  would	  also	  have	  to	  occur.	  	  A	  lawyer	  code	  does	  not	  make	  the	  legal	  culture.	  	  Legal	  systems	  and	  lawyer	  codes	  are	  highly	  culture-­‐bound	  and	   -­‐based.	   	  On	  some	   level,	   asking	  whether	  a	  U.S.	  model	  would	  be	  better	  for	  a	  civil	  law	  nation	  or	  a	  civil	  law	  system	  	   25 Laurel	  S.	  Terry,	  A	  Primer	  on	  MDPs:	  Should	  the	  “No”	  Rule	  Become	  the	  New	  Rule?,	  72	  TEMP.	  L.	  REV.	  869,	  878–79	  (1999)	  (noting	  that	  in	  1999,	  6362	  lawyers	  worked	  for	  Big	   Five	   firms,	   and	   if	   the	   number	   of	   lawyers	   working	   at	   the	   Big	   Five	   firms	   was	  combined	  with	  the	  number	  of	  lawyer	  employed	  by	  traditional	  law	  firms,	  the	  listing	  of	  the	  ten	  largest	  law	  firms	  worldwide	  would	  include	  three	  of	  the	  Big	  Five).	  26 See	  Commission	  on	  Multidisciplinary	  Practice,	  American	  Bar	  Ass’n,	  Final	  Report	  (1999),	   available	   at	   http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional	  _responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdprecommendation.html	  (recommending	  that	  MDPs	  be	  allowed	  to	  provide	  legal	  services);	  see	  also	  Deborah	  L.	  Rhode,	  Access	  to	  Justice:	  Connecting	  Principles	  to	  Practice,	  17	  GEO.	  J.	  LEGAL	  ETHICS	  369,	  410–15	  (2004)	  (arguing	  that	  the	  expansion	  of	  MDPs	  would	  benefit	  a	  variety	  of	  client	  groups,	  including	  “elderly,	  juvenile,	  domestic	  violence,	  or	  immigrant	  clients”);	  see	  also	  Terry,	   supra	   note	   25,	   at	   891	   (“Those	  who	   favor	  MDPs	   argue,	   inter	   alia,	   that	  MDPs	  provide	   one-­‐stop	   shopping,	   better	   service	   (because	   of	   the	   broader	   expertise	   of	   the	  service-­‐providers	   and	   closer	   cooperation	   of	   an	   interdisciplinary	   team),	   and	   cost-­‐effectiveness.”).	  27 See	  David	  Millon,	  Who	  “Caused”	  the	  Enron	  Debacle?,	  60	  WASH.	  &	  LEE	  L.	  REV.	  309,	  319–21	   (discussing	   the	   conflicts	   of	   interest	   present	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	  Arthur	   Anderson	   and	   Enron,	   which	   contributed	   to	   the	   Enron	   collapse);	   see	   also	  Lawrence	  J.	  Fox,	  MDPs	  Done	  Gone:	  The	  Silver	  Lining	  in	  the	  Very	  Black	  Enron	  Cloud,	  44	  ARIZ.	  L.	  REV.	  547,	  548	  (2002)	  (claiming	  that	  “Enron	  proved	  the	  death	  knell	  of	  MDPs”).	  28 Sarbanes-­‐Oxley	   Act	   of	   2002,	   Pub.	   L.	   No,	   107-­‐204,	   116	   Stat.	   745	   (codified	   in	  scattered	  sections	  of	  11,	  15,	  18,	  28,	  and	  29	  U.S.C.).	  29 See	   Larry	   E.	   Ribstein,	   The	   Death	   of	   Big	   Law	   2010	   Wis.	   L.	   Rev.	   749	   (2010)	  (proposing	  new	  business	  models	  to	  restructure	  the	  current	  economic	  models	  used	  by	  large	  law	  firms).	  30 See	   RICHARD	   SUSSKIND,	   THE	   END	   OF	   LAWYERS?:	   RETHINKING	   THE	   NATURE	   OF	   LEGAL	  SERVICES	   (2008)	   (predicting	   large	   changes	   in	   the	   legal	   marketplace	   resulting	   from	  new	  approaches	  to	  valuing	  legal	  services	  and	  new	  technologies	  used	  in	  the	  field);	  see	  
also	   THOMAS	  MORGAN,	   THE	  VANISHING	  AMERICAN	   LAWYER	   (2010)	   (discussing	   the	   need	  for	  lawyers	  to	  adapt	  to	  new	  client	  expectations	  and	  gain	  expertise	  in	  nonlegal	  issues	  to	  succeed	  in	  the	  changing	  legal	  marketplace).	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  would	   be	   better	   for	   the	   United	   States	   is	   an	   absurd	   question.	  	  There	  is	  simply	  too	  much	  cultural	  foundation	  for	  a	  legal	  system	  or	  lawyer	   code	   for	   any	   system	   to	   be	   a	   good	   model	   in	   an	   entirely	  different	  culture.31	  Further,	   the	  “U.S.-­‐model”	   is	  not	  really	  one	  model	  but	   fifty-­‐one.	  	  Fifty-­‐one	   (plus	   all	   the	   individual	   federal	   courts),	   including	  different	  licensing	  entities	  and	  fifty-­‐one	  codes.	   	  There	  is	  so	  much	  local	  variation	  on	  this	   level,	   that	  the	  U.S.	  system	  of	   licensure	  and	  local	  control	  is	  not	  a	  good	  fit	  with	  a	  global	  system.32	  	  Any	  move	  to	  make	  the	  so-­‐called	  U.S.	  model	  the	  international	  model	  would	  first	  have	  to	  navigate	  the	  harmonization	  of	  the	  fifty	  U.S.	  states	  and	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia	  and	  the	  variations	  among	  federal	  courts	  and	  administrative	   agencies.	   	   To	   date,	   those	   efforts	   at	   internal	  harmonization	  have	  fallen	  substantially	  short.33	  
IV	  
WHAT	  HAPPENS	  WHEN	  A	  CODE	  DOES	  NOT	  FIT	  A	  CULTURE?	  Laws	  made	  of	  well-­‐crafted	  words	   that	  no	  one	   follows	  because	  of	   the	   culture	   misfit,	   reminiscent	   of	   Soviet-­‐style	   codes,	   create	  mischief	   rather	   than	   good.	   	   The	   result	   in	   such	   circumstances	   is	  government	   power	   to	   oppress.	   	   Everyone	   violates	   such	   rules,	  therefore,	   anyone	   the	   government	   chooses	   to	   prosecute	   is	  factually	  guilty	  of	  violating	  the	  rule.	  In	  Georgia,	  for	  example,	  a	  new	  judicial	  ethics	  code	  was	  installed	  with	   the	   help	   of	   U.S.	   NGOs.34	   	   The	   words	   of	   the	   code	   were	  admirable	  and	  reflected	  positive	  norms	  of	  behavior.	   	  But	  as	  they	  were	   installed,	   they	   misfit	   the	   judicial	   culture	   such	   that	   few	  judges	  were	   in	  compliance.	   	  That	  general	  noncompliance	   left	   the	  government	  with	  the	  power	  to	  remove	  judges	  it	  did	  not	  favor	  by	  charging	   them	   with	   ethics	   violations.	   	   Government-­‐supported	  judges	  were	   violating	   the	   same	   rules,	   but	   those	   violations	  were	  ignored.	  
	   31 MERRYMAN	  &	  PÉREZ-­‐PERDOMO,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  150.	  32 Not	   only	   are	   the	   codes	   different	   in	   important	   respects	   from	   U.S.	   state	   to	   U.S.	  state,	  see,	  e.g.,	  John	  S.	  Dzienkowski,	  Professional	  Responsibility	  Rules,	  Standards,	  and	  Statutes,	   State	   Variation	   section	   (Thompson-­‐West	   2009),	   but	   the	   licensing	   systems	  and	   requirements	   vary	   substantially.	   	   Comprehensive	   Guide	   to	   Bar	   Admission	  Requirements	  (ABA	  2010).	  33 ABA	  Report	  of	  the	  Commission	  on	  Multijurisdictional	  Practice	  7–12	  (Aug.	  2002)	  
available	  at	  http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/final_mjp_rpt	  _6_5_1.authcheckdam.pdf	   (suggesting	   that	   efforts	   at	   single	   bar	   license	   are	   not	  currently	  realistic).	  34 GEORGIAN	  CODE	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  ETHICS	  (1998)	  (on	  file	  with	  author).	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V	  
WHAT	  MODEL	  THEN?	  In	  the	  judicial	  ethics	  arena,	  much	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  from	  a	  genuinely	  international	  starting	  point:	  the	  Bangalore	  Principles.	  	  The	   Bangalore	   Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct	   identify	   six	   core	  values	   of	   the	   judiciary:	   Independence,	   Impartiality,	   Integrity,	  Propriety,	   Equality,	   Competence,	   and	   Diligence.	   	   The	   values	   are	  followed	   by	   relevant	   principles	   and	   detailed	   statements	   of	   their	  application.	  	  The	  Principles	  represent	  the	  culmination	  of	  years	  of	  work	  and	  the	  input	  of	  senior	  and	  chief	  justices	  from	  over	  seventy-­‐five	  countries,	  who	  considered	  over	   thirty	   judiciary	  codes,	  when	  developing	   the	   document.35	   	   The	   principles	   are	   unique	   in	   that	  they	   involve	   judicial	   self-­‐regulation	   and	   find	   common	   ground	  with	  virtually	  every	  legal	  system.	   	  Although	  relatively	  recent,	  the	  Bangalore	   Principles	   have	   evoked	   a	   sea	   change	   by	   encouraging	  numerous	  nations	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  of	  judicial	  corruption.	  In	  structure	  but	  not	  in	  level	  of	  detail,	  the	  Principles	  bear	  some	  resemblance	  to	  the	  former	  1969	  ABA	  Model	  Code	  of	  Professional	  Conduct.	   	   The	   six	   core	   “values”	   are	   structurally	   similar	   to	   the	  Canons.	  	  The	  Principles,	  however,	  present	  no	  “black	  letter”	  law,	  no	  Disciplinary	  Rules	  in	  the	  parlance	  of	  the	  ABA	  Model	  Code.	  In	   2000,	   the	   United	   Nations	   Center	   for	   International	   Crime	  Prevention	   (CICP)	   working	   with	   Transparency	   International,	   an	  NGO,	  invited	  chief	  justices	  and	  senior	  judges	  from	  eight	  Asian	  and	  African	   nations	   to	   convene	   in	   Vienna.	   	   Participants	   included	   the	  chief	   justice	   of	   Bangladesh,	   the	   chief	   justice	   of	   Karnatka	   State,	  India,	   the	   chief	   justice	   of	   Nigeria,	   the	   former	   chief	   justice	   of	  Tanzania,	   the	   chairman	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Service	   Commission	   of	  Uganda,	   and	   the	   vice	   president	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   of	  South	  Africa.	  	  The	  group	  was	  chaired	  by	  the	  former	  vice-­‐president	  of	   the	   International	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   Christopher	   Weeramantry.	  	  These	   judges	   eventually	   became	   known	   as	   the	   Judicial	   Integrity	  Group.36	  The	   initial	   meeting	   was	   held	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   Tenth	  United	   Nations	   Congress	   on	   the	   Prevention	   of	   Crime	   and	  Treatment	   of	   Offenders	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   addressing	   judicial	  corruption.	   	   Initial	   discussions	   led	   by	   CICP	   centered	   on	   the	  importance	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  with	  regard	  to	  social	  and	  economic	  development	   and	  on	   the	  potential	   role	   the	  United	  Nations	   could	  	   35 Shelby	   A.	   Linton	   Keddie,	   Outsourcing	   Justice:	   A	   Judge’s	   Responsibility	   When	  
Sending	  Parties	  to	  Mediation,	  25	  PENN	  ST.	  INT’L	  L.	  REV.	  717,	  733	  (2007).	  36 U.N.	   ODCCP	   Rep.	   of	   the	   First	   Meeting	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Integrity	   Group	   on	  Strengthening	   Judicial	   Integrity,	   Apr.	   15–16,	   2000	   (2000),	  available	   at	   www.unodc	  .org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp6.pdf	  [hereinafter	  First	  Meeting].	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  play	   in	  helping	  countries	   strengthen	   judicial	   integrity.	   	  The	  CICP	  envisioned	   involving	   other	   countries	   from	   varying	   judicial	  traditions	  that	  could	  build	  on	  the	  initiatives	  of	  the	  original	  group.	  As	   a	   result,	   what	   eventually	   became	   known	   as	   the	   Judicial	  Integrity	   Group	   began	   the	   process	   of	   developing	   a	   proposed	  universal	   statement	   of	   judicial	   ethics.	   	   Preliminary	   discussions	  envisioned	   that	   the	   work	   would	   be	   utilized	   to	   develop	   an	  international	   judicial	   code,	   but	   over	   time,	   with	   input	   from	   a	  number	  of	  judges	  and	  countries,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  a	  flexible	  set	  of	   universal	   principles	   that	   could	   be	   adapted	   to	   each	   State’s	  unique	   judiciary	   would	   be	   more	   appropriate	   and	   a	   feasible	  starting	  point.	  The	   group	   agreed	   that	   the	   national	   judiciary	  must	   assume	   an	  active	  role	  in	  strengthening	  judicial	  integrity	  by	  effecting	  systemic	  reforms	   and	   that	   there	   was	   an	   urgent	   need	   for	   a	   universally	  acceptable	  statement	  of	  judicial	  standards	  that	  could	  be	  enforced	  at	   the	  national	   level	  by	  the	   judiciary,	  without	  the	   intervention	  of	  the	  executive	  or	   legislative	  branches	  of	   government.37	   	  Although	  the	  initial	  group	  was	  selected	  from	  counties	  sharing	  common	  law	  traditions,	   the	   group	   quickly	   recognized	   the	   importance	   of	  involving	  judicial	  systems	  in	  civil	  law	  countries.	  	  With	  these	  goals	  in	   mind,	   the	   Judicial	   Integrity	   Group	   agreed	   to	   have	   regular	  contact	   with	   each	   other,	   observers,	   and	   coordinators	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  sharing	  information	  and	  to	  meet	  for	  the	  second	  time	  in	  Bangalore,	  India.38	  The	  Judicial	  Integrity	  Group	  reconvened	  in	  Bangalore,	  India	  on	  February	  24–26,	  2001	  and	   included	  special	   invitee	   Justice	  Claire	  L’Heureux	   Dubé,	  who	   sits	   on	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Canada	   and	  serves	   as	   president	   of	   the	   International	   Commission	   of	   Jurists.	  	  The	  meeting	   was	   hosted	   by	   the	   High	   Court	   and	   Government	   of	  Karnataka	   State,	   India	   and	   facilitated	   by	   the	   United	   Kingdom	  Department	   for	   International	   Development	   (DFID).	   	   During	   this	  meeting,	   a	   draft	   was	   presented	   by	   CICP,	   core	   values	   were	  identified,	   and	   relevant	   principles	  were	   developed.	   	   Participants	  developed	  broad	  principles	  by	  drawing	  on	  the	  best	  practices	  and	  precedents	   from	   many	   jurisdictions	   throughout	   the	   world.39	  	  Participants	  agreed	   that	   the	  draft	  principles	  would	  be	  presented	  	   37 COMMENTARY	   ON	   THE	   BANGALORE	   PRINCIPLES	   OF	   JUDICIAL	   CONDUCT	   9–10	   (Sept.	  2007),	   available	   at	   http://www.unrol.org/files/publications_unodc_commentary-­‐e[1].pdf	  [hereinafter	  COMMENTARY].	  38 See	  generally,	  First	  Meeting,	  supra	  note	  36.	  39 U.N.	  ODCCP	  Rep.	  of	  the	  Second	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Group	  on	  Strengthening	  Judicial	   Integrity,	   Feb	  24–26,	   2001,	   4–5	   (2001),	  available	   at	   http://www.unodc.org	  /pdf/crime/gpac	  publications/cicp5.pdf.	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  47	  to	   the	   September	   2001,	  meeting	   of	   the	   African	   Chief	   Justices	   in	  Nigeria,	   to	   the	  August	   2001,	  meeting	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justices	   of	   the	  Commonwealth	   in	   Uganda,	   to	   the	   judges	   of	   the	   International	  Court	  of	   Justice,	  and	  to	   the	   International	  Advisory	  Council	  of	   the	  World	  Bank.	  The	  participants	  also	  began	  to	  consider	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  draft	  principles	   could	   be	   further	   utilized	   and	   emphasized	   the	   need	   to	  take	   the	   draft	   to	   countries	   outside	   of	   the	   common	   law	   legal	  tradition.	  	  Dato	  Param	  Cumaraswamy,	  U.N.	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	   Independence	   of	   Judges	   and	   Lawyers,	   indicated	   that	   he	  was	  interested	   in	   the	   eventual	   adoption	   of	   an	   authenticated	  international	   code	   of	   justice	   by	   the	   U.N.	   General	   Assembly.	  	  Additionally,	   Justice	   L’Heureux	   Dubé	   of	   Canada,	   indicated	   the	  need	   for	   a	   representative	   body	   of	   chief	   justices	   that	   could	  promote	   a	   draft	   international	   code.	   	   Following	   the	   second	  meeting,	   the	  draft	  adopted	  by	   the	   Judicial	   Integrity	  Group	  began	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  Bangalore	  Draft	  Code	  of	  Judicial	  Conduct.	  In	   subsequent	   months,	   the	   Bangalore	   Draft	   was	   dispersed	   to	  judges	   from	   both	   common	   and	   civil	   law	   countries.	   	   It	   was	  presented	  to	  and	  discussed	  at	  judicial	  conferences	  involving	  chief	  and	  senior	   justices	   from	  over	  seventy-­‐five	  common	  and	  civil	   law	  countries.	   	   American	   Bar	   Association	   offices	   in	   Central	   and	  Eastern	   Europe	   had	   the	   Bangalore	   Draft	   translated	   into	   the	  national	   languages	   of	   Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,	   Bulgaria,	   Croatia,	  Kosovo,	   Romania,	   Serbia,	   and	   Slovakia.	   	   Subsequently,	   it	   was	  reviewed	   by	   judges,	   judicial	   associations,	   and	   regional	  constitutional	  and	  supreme	  courts.40	  In	   June	   2002,	   the	   Bangalore	   Draft	   was	   reviewed	   by	   the	  Working	  Party	  of	   the	  Consultative	  Council	  of	  European	   Judges,	  a	  widely	   representative	   group	   chaired	   by	   Lord	   Justice	   Mance,	  resulting	   in	   a	   comprehensive	   discussion	   from	   the	   civil	   law	  perspective.	   	   Their	   written	   comments	   provided	   significant	  contributions	  regarding	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  as	  well	  as	   rules	   of	   professional	   conduct,	   ethics,	   and	   impartiality.	   	   The	  judges	   referenced	   recent	   codes	   of	   judicial	   conduct	   such	   as	   the	  Australian	  Guide	  to	  Judicial	  Conduct,	  the	  Model	  Rules	  of	  Conduct	  for	   Judges	   of	   the	   Baltic	   States,	   the	   Code	   of	   Judicial	   Ethics	   for	  Judges	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  and	  the	  Code	  of	  Judicial	  Ethics	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  Judges	  Association.41	  Based	   on	   the	   concerns	   and	   recommendations	   of	   the	   Judicial	  Integrity	   Group,	   Judge	   C.G.	  Weeramantry,	   the	   group’s	   chairman,	  	   40 COMMENTARY,	  supra	  note	  37,	  at	  12.	  41 Id.	  at	  13.	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  convened	  a	  round-­‐table	  meeting	  of	  chief	  and	  senior	  justices	  from	  non-­‐common	  law	  jurisdictions.	  	  The	  meeting	  was	  held	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  their	  views	  on	  the	  revised	  Bangalore	  Draft	  Code	  of	  Judicial	  Conduct.	  	  This	  time	  the	  justices	  met	  on	  November	  25–26,	  2002	  at	  The	  Hague,	  Netherlands.	  	  The	  gathering	  was	  sponsored	  by	  a	  grant	  from	   the	   United	   Kingdom’s	   DFID	   and	   supported	   by	   the	   U.N.	  Centre	   for	   Crime	   Prevention	   and	   the	   U.N.	   Office	   of	   the	   High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights.	  Participants	   included	   judges	   from	   Brazil,	   Czech	   Republic,	  Egypt,	   France,	   Mexico,	   Mozambique,	   The	   Netherlands,	   Norway,	  Philippines,	   and	   Germany.	   	   Eight	   additional	   judges	   from	   the	  International	   Court	   of	   Justice	   attended	   and	   participated	   in	   one	  session.42	  Along	   with	   the	   Bangalore	   Draft	   Code	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct,	  participants	   were	   given	   the	   Comments	   of	   the	  Working	   Party	   of	  the	   Consultative	   Counsel	   of	   European	   Judges	   (CCJE-­‐GT)	   on	   the	  Bangalore	  Draft;	   the	  opinion	  prepared	  by	  the	  CCJE-­‐GT	  specialist;	  the	  annotated	  version	  of	   the	  Bangalore	  Code	  of	   Judicial	  Conduct	  with	   comments	   by	   judges	   and	   judicial	   associations,	   including	  comments	  by	   judges	   in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  countries;	  and	  several	  U.N.	  documents	  including	  the	  Basic	  Principles	  on	  the	  Independence	   of	   the	   Judiciary,	   Basic	   Principles	   on	   the	   Role	   of	  Lawyers	  and	  the	  U.N.	  Guidelines	  of	  the	  Role	  of	  Prosecutors.43	  At	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   round-­‐table	   meeting,	   several	   key	  amendments	  were	  adopted	  to	  the	  Bangalore	  Draft,	  including:	  the	  deletion	  of	  all	  references	  to	  a	  code	  of	  judicial	  conduct	  and	  instead	  describing	  the	  document	  in	  terms	  of	  principles	  of	  judicial	  conduct;	  re-­‐prioritization	  of	  the	  order	  of	  the	  judicial	  values	  to	  their	  present	  order;	   the	   deletion	   of	   implementation	   and	   accountability	   as	   a	  value;	   and	   the	   inclusion	   of	   applications	   for	   each	   value	   and	  principle,	  rather	  than	  a	  code.44	   	  There	  was	  significant	  divergence	  regarding	  political	  restrictions.	  	  Civil	  law	  judges	  argued	  that	  there	  was	  not	  a	  general	  international	  consensus	  whether	  judges	  should	  be	  free	  to	  engage	  in	  or	  refrain	  from	  political	  participation.	  	  These	  judges	  noted	  that	  in	  one	  European	  country,	  judges	  are	  elected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  party	  membership.	  	  In	  others,	  judges	  have	  the	  right	  to	  engage	   in	   politics	   and	   be	   elected	   as	   members	   of	   local	   councils	  while	  remaining	  as	  judges	  or	  to	  be	  elected	  to	  parliament	  resulting	  in	   the	   suspension	   of	   their	   judicial	   status.	   	   Ultimately,	   it	   was	  	   42 U.N.	   ODC,	   Summary	   Record	   of	   the	   Round-­‐Table	   Meeting	   of	   Chief	   Justices	   to	  Review	  the	  Bangalore	  Draft	  Code	  of	  Judicial	  Conduct	  2	  (Nov.	  25–26,	  2002),	  available	  
at	  http://www	  .unodc.org/pdf/corruption/hague_meeting_02.pdf.	  43 Id.	  at	  3.	  44 Id.	  at	  4–5.	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  47	  decided	   that	   each	   country	   should	   determine	   a	   judge’s	  requirement	  of	  neutrality,	  and	  the	  civil	   law	  judges	  conceded	  that	  judges	  should	  refrain	  from	  political	  activity	  likely	  to	  compromise	  judicial	  independence	  or	  the	  appearance	  of	  impartiality.45	  	  Out	  of	  the	   round-­‐table,	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct	  (Bangalore	  Principles)	  were	  developed	  and	  approved.	  On	   January	   10–12,	   2003	   the	   Judicial	   Integrity	   Group	   met	   in	  Columbo,	   Sri	   Lanka.	   	   The	   Group	   met	   to	   review	   mechanisms	  utilized	   in	   pilot	   survey	   programs	   in	   three	   selected	   countries:	  Uganda,	   Sri	   Lanka	   and	   Nigeria,	   share	   judicial	   experiences	   in	  addressing	   identified	   weaknesses	   in	   those	   countries,	   consider	  what	   steps	   ought	   to	   be	   taken	   to	   the	   secure	   the	   passage	   of	   the	  Bangalore	   Principles	   before	   the	   U.N.	   General	   Assembly,	   and	   to	  decide	  what	  measures	  should	  be	   taken	  by	  national	   judiciaries	   in	  order	  to	  implement	  these	  Bangalore	  Principles.	  During	   the	   third	  meeting,	   the	   Judicial	   Integrity	  Group	   learned	  from	  Dato	  Param	  Cumaraswamy,	  U.N.	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  Independence	   of	   Judges	   and	   Lawyers,	   that	   the	   Bangalore	  Principles	   would	   be	   presented	   to	   the	   next	   session	   of	   the	   U.N.	  Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	   as	   part	   of	   his	   report	   with	   the	  request	  that	  the	  Commission	  either	  endorse	  or	  note	  them.	  	  In	  this	  context,	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   were	   posted	   on	   the	   U.N.	  website,	   making	   them	   accessible	   throughout	   the	   world.	   	   It	   was	  also	   decided	   that	   discussions	   should	   take	   place	   with	   various	  Foreign	   Ministries	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   presenting	   the	   Bangalore	  Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct	   for	   adoption	   by	   the	   U.N.	   General	  Assembly.	   	   In	  addition,	   the	  Bangalore	  Principles	  were	  forwarded	  to	   the	   U.N.	   Crime	   Commission	   seeking	   a	   resolution	   requesting	  member	   states	   to	   implement	   the	   principles.	   	   Finally,	   the	   Group	  decided	   that	   the	   Chairman	   should	   write	   to	   the	   national	   Chief	  Justices	   in	   all	   countries	   to	   educate	   them	   about	   the	   Bangalore	  Principles	  and	  to	  invite	  comments.	  	  Above	  all,	  it	  was	  stressed	  that	  however	   universal	   acceptance	   of	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   was	  achieved,	  “ownership”	  must	  remain	  with	  national	   judiciaries	  and	  no	  part	  of	  the	  text	  should	  be	  amended	  except	  by	  national	  judicial	  organizations.46	  On	   April	   23,	   2003,	   the	   fifty-­‐ninth	   Session	   of	   the	   U.N.	  Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	   adopted	   a	   resolution,	   without	  dissent,	   that	   noted	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct	  	   45 COMMENTARY,	  supra	  note	  37,	  at	  14–15.	  46 See	   generally,	   U.N.	   ODCCP	   Rep.	   of	   the	   Third	  Meeting	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Group	   on	  Strengthening	   Judicial	   Integrity,	   Jan.	   10–12,	   2003,	   4–5	   (2003),	   available	   at	  http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp4.pdf	   [hereinafter	   Third	  Meeting].	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  and	  brought	  the	  Principles	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  Member	  States,	  the	  relevant	   U.N.	   organizations	   and	   intergovernmental	   and	  nongovernmental	  organizations	  for	  their	  consideration.	  The	   Judicial	   Integrity	  Group	  reconvened	   in	  Vienna,	  Austria	  on	  October	  27–28,	  2005.	  	  During	  this	  meeting	  the	  Group	  had	  a	  great	  deal	   to	   celebrate,	   given	   the	   wide	   notoriety	   the	   Bangalore	  Principles	   had	   attained.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   Principles	   had	   been	  utilized	   by	   the	   UNODC,	   the	   European	   Union,	   the	   Council	   of	  Europe,	   the	   Commonwealth	   Secretariat,	   and	   the	   Brandeis	  Institute	   for	   International	   Judges.	   	   In	   addition,	   the	   Bangalore	  Principles	  had	  been	  used	  by	  several	  countries	  such	  as	  Uganda,	  Sri	  Lanka,	   and	  Kenya.	   	  Both	  Belize	   and	   the	  Philippines	  had	  adopted	  judicial	   codes	   based	   entirely	   on	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles.	   	   A	  number	   of	   nongovernmental	   organizations	   including	   the	  International	   Commission	   of	   Jurists	   and	   the	   American	   Bar	  Association	   were	   incorporating	   the	   Principles	   in	   programs	   in	  Central	  Europe,	  Asia,	  and	  Africa,	  and	  several	  countries	  were	  using	  them	  to	  train	  judges	  in	  basic	  ethics.47	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  2002	  interactions	  with	  the	  Working	  Party	  of	  the	  Consultative	  Council	  of	  European	  Judges	  and	  the	  round-­‐table	  meeting	   of	   non-­‐common	   law	   chief	   justices	   described	   above,	   the	  Bangalore	   Principles	   had	   been	   presented	   to	   a	   November,	   2002	  meeting	   of	   Spanish-­‐speaking	   Chief	   Justices	   in	   Cancun,	  Mexico;	   a	  January,	   2003	   meeting	   of	   Arab	   Federation	   of	   Constitutional	  Courts	   and	   Councils;	   an	   April	   2003	   Commonwealth	   Law	  Conference	   in	   Melbourne;	   an	   April,	   2003	   meeting	   of	   the	  World	  Jurists	   Association	   in	   Sydney,	   Australia;	   as	  well	   as	   a	   September,	  2003	  Conference	  of	  Asian-­‐Pacific	  Chief	  Justices	  in	  Tokyo,	  Japan.48	  By	   involving	   a	   large	   number	   of	   organizations	   and	   judges,	   the	  Judicial	   Integrity	   Group	   received	   significant	   feedback	   that	  stressed	   the	  need	   for	   examples	   and	   illustrations	   explaining	  how	  the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   were	   intended	   to	   work.49	   	   The	   Group	  agreed	   on	   the	   need	   for	   a	   commentary	   guide	   that	  would	   explain	  the	  drafting	  and	  cross	  cultural	  process	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	   values	   and	   principle	   included.	   	   The	   commentary	   was	   also	  needed	  to	  facilitate	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   to	   domestic	   issues	   and	   problems.50	  	  	   47 See	  generally,	  U.N.	  ODCCP	  Rep.	  of	   the	  Fourth	  Meeting	  of	   the	   Judicial	  Group	  on	  Strengthening	   Judicial	   Integrity,	   Oct.	   27–28,	   2005	   (Oct.	   2005),	   available	   at	  http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publication_jig4.pdf	   [hereinafter	   Fourth	  Meeting].	  48 See	  generally,	  Third	  Meeting,	  supra	  note	  46.	  49 Fourth	  Meeting,	  supra	  note	  47	  at	  5.	  50 COMMENTARY,	  supra	  note	  37	  at	  16.	  
62	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  47	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  developing	  the	  commentary,	  the	  Group	  members	  agreed	  to	  provide	   illustrations	   from	   local	   case	   law	   and	   other	   examples	   to	  the	  Group	  coordinator,	  who	  then	  utilized	  the	  examples	  in	  a	  draft	  commentary.	   	   In	   addition,	   it	   was	   decided	   that	   the	   commentary	  would	  reference	  relevant	  principles	  of	  international	  law	  including	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  International	  Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights.	   	   Decisions	   by	   the	  Human	  Rights	   Committee,	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   the	  Inter-­‐American	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   others	   as	   well	   as	  decisions	   by	   constitutional	   courts	   and	   judicial	   advisory	  commissions	   were	   also	   utilized	   as	   sources.	   	   Group	   members	  agreed	   that	   the	   commentary	   should	   use	   the	   context	   of	  international	   instruments,	   courts,	   and	   treaties	   to	   explain	   the	  purpose	   of	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   and	   references	   to	   religious	  and	   cultural	   traditions	   underlying	   the	   values	   and	   principles	  should	   be	   included.	   	   Once	   a	   draft	   commentary	  was	   prepared,	   it	  was	   to	  be	  circulated	   for	  each	   individual	  member’s	   consideration	  and	  approval.51	  On	   April	   2006,	   the	   Commission	   on	   Crime	   Prevention	   and	  Criminal	   Justice	   adopted,	   without	   dissent,	   a	   resolution	   co-­‐sponsored	   by	   Egypt,	   France,	   Germany,	   Nigeria,	   and	   the	  Philippines.	   	   The	   resolution,	   Strengthening	   Basic	   Principles	   of	  Judicial	  Conduct,	   included	  a	  number	  of	  recommendations	  for	  the	  United	   Nations	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Council	   (ECOSOC).	   	   These	  recommendations	   included	   having	   the	   ECOSOC	   encourage	   U.N.	  Member	   States	   to	   consider	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   when	  reviewing	  or	  developing	  rules	  of	  judicial	  conduct,	  requesting	  that	  the	   ECOSOC	   invite	   Member	   States	   to	   submit	   opinions	   and	  suggested	   revisions	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General;	   and	   forming	   an	  open-­‐ended	   Intergovernmental	   Expert	   Group	   to	   work	   in	  cooperation	   with	   the	   Judicial	   Integrity	   Group	   and	   other	  international	   and	   regional	   judicial	   organizations	   to	   develop	   a	  Commentary	  on	   the	  Bangalore	  Principles	  of	   Judicial	  Conduct.	   	   In	  formulating	   the	   Commentary,	   the	   Intergovernmental	   Expert	  Group	   was	   charged	   with	   considering	   the	   views	   submitted	   by	  Member	   States.	   	   It	   was	   requested	   that	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	  report	  to	  the	  Commission	  on	  Crime	  Prevention	  at	  its	  next	  meeting	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  proposed	  resolution.52	  In	   July	   2006,	   the	   United	   Nations	   ECOSOC	   adopted	   the	  Strengthening	   Basic	   Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct	   resolution	  without	  a	  vote.53	  	   51 See	  generally,	  Fourth	  Meeting,	  supra	  note	  47.	  52 See	  generally,	  COMMENTARY,	  supra	  note	  37,	  at	  17.	  53 Id.	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  During	   a	   March	   2007,	   joint	   meeting,	   the	   Judicial	   Integrity	  Group	   and	   the	   Intergovernmental	   Expert	   Group,	   after	   an	  extensive	   review	   process,	   agreed	   upon	   the	   Commentary	   on	   the	  Bangalore	   Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct	   (Commentary).	   	   Each	  paragraph	   was	   considered	   separately	   and	   each	   amendment	   or	  deletion	  was	  discussed	  and	  agreed	  upon.	  Perhaps	  most	   impressive	  was	   the	   involvement	  and	  consensus	  of	  the	  number	  of	  participants	  involved.	  	  Participants	  included	  the	  Judicial	  Integrity	  Group	  and	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Expert	  Group,	  comprised	  of	  judges	  and	  senior	  officials	  from	  Algeria,	  Azerbaijan,	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Finland,	  Germany,	  Hungary,	  Indonesia,	  Iran,	  Latvia,	   Libya,	   Moldova,	   Morocco,	   Namibia,	   The	   Netherlands,	  Nigeria,	   The	   Islamic	   Republic	   of	   Pakistan,	   Panama,	   Romania,	  South	  Korea,	  Serbia,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Syria,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Additional	  participants	  included	  senior	  judges	  from	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	   France,	   Argentina,	   Indonesia,	   Egypt,	   Nepal,	   Spain,	  Hungary,	   Namibia,	   Germany,	   Finland,	   Algeria,	   and	   Nigeria.	  	  Several	  of	   the	  participants	  held	   international	  positions	   including	  Lord	   Mance,	   House	   of	   Lords,	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   former	  Chairman	   of	   the	   Consultative	   Council	   of	   European	   Judges;	   and	  Judge	  Christine	  Chanet,	  Conseillere,	  Cour	  de	  Cassation,	  France	  and	  Chair	  of	  the	  U.N.	  Human	  Rights	  Committee.54	  The	   Commentary	   expands	   upon	   the	   six	   core	   values	   and	  accompanying	  principles	   that	   comprise	   the	  Bangalore	  Principles	  of	   Judicial	   Conduct	   and	   incorporates	   relevant	   international	   and	  human	   rights	   instruments	   such	   as:	   the	   International	  Convention	  on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   All	   Forms	   of	   Racial	   Discrimination,	   the	  International	   Convention	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   All	   Forms	   of	  Discrimination	  Against	  Women	  (CEDAW),	  the	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Elimination	   of	   All	   Forms	   of	   Intolerance	   and	   of	   Discrimination	  based	  on	  Religion	  or	  Belief,	  and	  others.55	   	   In	  addition,	   it	   includes	  relevant	  religious	  and	  cultural	  traditions	  from	  around	  the	  world.	  	  The	   appendix	   references	   the	   Ancient	   Middle	   East,	   Hindu	   Law,	  Buddhist	   Philosophy,	   Roman	   Law,	   Chinese	   Law,	   African	   Law,	  Jewish	   Law,	   Christianity,	   and	   Islamic	   Law.56	   	   Its	   focus	   on	  commonalities	   makes	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   appealing	   to	  virtually	  every	  country.	  By	   2007,	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   had	   been	   used	   to	   revise	  existing,	   or	   to	   create	   new,	   judicial	   codes	   in	   the	   following	  countries:	   the	   Netherlands,	   England,	   Wales,	   Mauritius,	   Bulgaria,	  	   54 Id.	  at	  18.	  55 Id.	  at	  111.	  56 See	  generally,	  id.	  at	  135–41.	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   and	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   Additionally,	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	  have	  been	  adopted	   in	  Belize	  and	  the	  Philippines,57	   in	  addition	  to	  some	  of	  the	  countries	  first	  involved	  in	  the	  drafting.	  Given	   the	  widespread	   involvement	  of	   judges	   from	  around	   the	  world	   in	   developing	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  measure	  their	  far-­‐reaching	  effect.	  	  A	  search	  of	  international	  news	  sources	  reveals	  that	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  have	  either	  utilized	  or	  modeled	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct.	   	   Some	   of	  these	  countries	  include	  Zambia,58	  Nepal59,	  Republic	  of	  Moldova,60	  the	   Fiji	   Islands,61	   Malaysia,62	   and	   Botswana.63	   	   The	   United	  Kingdom	  Supreme	  Court’s	  Guide	  to	  Judicial	  Conduct	  refers	  to	  the	  Bangalore	  Principles	  and	  incorporates	  its	  core	  values.64	  The	  Bangalore	  Principles	  have	  universal	  appeal,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  have	   been	   utilized	   by	   specialty	   judicial	   groups	   in	   addition	   to	  national	   ones.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   International	   Association	   of	  Youth	  and	  Family	  Judges	  and	  Magistrates	  incorporated	  references	  to	   the	   Bangalore	   Principles	   in	   its	   preamble	   to	   the	   Proposal	   For	  Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Ethics	   for	   Youth	   and	   Family	   Judges	   and	  Magistrates	  and	  recognized	  their	  application	  to	  judicial	  functions	  in	   this	   area.	   	  The	   final	  proposal	   included	  many	  of	   the	  Bangalore	  Principles’	  core	  values	  and	  principles.65	  A	   similar	   approach	  holds	  promise	   for	   lawyer	   regulation.	   	   It	   is	  true	   that	   lawyering	   is	   more	   complex	   than	   judging.	   	   A	   more	  complex	   mixture	   of	   competing	   interests	   and	   values	   comes	   into	  play	   for	   lawyers	   than	   for	   judges.	   	   Nonetheless,	   a	   genuinely	  	   57 Greg	   Mayne,	   Judicial	   Integrity:	   The	   Accountability	   Gap	   and	   the	   Bangalore	  
Principles,	  TRANSPARENCY	   INTERNATIONAL	   GLOBAL	   CORRUPTION	  REPORT	   2007	   at	   40,	   42,	  (2007),	  available	  at	  http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2007#3.	  58 Zambia:	   Chief	   Justice	   Says	   Anti-­‐Graft	   Laws	   Under	   Review,	   WORLD	   NEWS	  CONNECTION,	  Jan.	  22,	  2010.	  59 Judges	   to	   discuss	   code,	   EKANTIPUR.COM,	  Mar.	   31,	   2009,	  available	  at	  2009	  WLNR	  6100510.	  60 JUDICIAL	   ETHICS:	   DEVELOPMENTS,	   CHALLENGES	   AND	   SOLUTIONS.	   MOLDOVA’S	  EXPERIENCE	   IN	   ENFORCING	   ETHICS	   STANDARDS	   FOR	   JUDGES,	  available	   at	  http://www.coe	  .int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/Ethics/Paper1_en.asp.	  61 The	  Honorable	  Mr.	   Justice	  Fatiak,	  Chief	   Justice	  of	  Fiji,	   Judicial	  Code	  of	  Conduct:	  
Fiji	   Islands,	   at	   http://www.paclii.org/fj/CodeofConduct/Foreword_and_Contents	  .htm.	  62 Review	   should	   follow	   principles,	   NEW	   STRAITS	   TIMES,	   Apr.	   4,	   2003,	   available	   at	  2003	  WLNR	  1869159.	  63 Kepaleswe	  C.	  Somolekae,	  Workshop	  Group	  No.	  3,	  BUILDING	  A	  JUDICIAL	  CULTURE	  ON	  THE	  BANGALORE	  PRINCIPLES	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  CONDUCT,	  on	  file	  with	  ORIL.	  64 UNITED	  KINGDOM	  SUPREME	  COURT,	  GUIDE	  TO	  JUDICIAL	  CONDUCT	  (2009),	  available	  at	  http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/guide_to_judicial_conduct.pdf.	  65 Int’l	   Ass’n	   of	   Youth	   and	   Family	   Judges	   and	   Magistrates,	   Report	   on	   the	  Committee	  Appointed	   to	  Propose	  Principles	  of	   Judicial	  Ethics	   for	  Youth	  And	  Family	  Judges	   and	   Magistrates	   (2010),	   available	   at	   www.minoriefamiglia.it/%5cdownload	  %5CReport%20Eng%2010.04.24.pdf.	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  international	   starting	   point,	   focusing	   not	   on	   detail	   but	   on	  fundamental	   principles,	   could	   follow	   a	   similar	   path	   to	   as	   much	  harmonization	  as	  is	  possible.	  
IV	  
A	  FOCUS	  ON	  FUNDAMENTAL	  PRINCIPLES	  Instead	   of	   pressing	   emerging	   democracies	   to	   adopt	   U.S.-­‐style	  codes,	   NGOs	   should	   instead	   focus	   their	   attention	   on	   seeking	  harmony	   on	   fundamental	   principles.	   	   Training	   programs,	   for	  example,	  should	  focus	  not	  on	  pushing	  the	  particular	  attributes	  of	  U.S.	   systems	   and	   codes,	   but	   rather	   on	   underlying	   fundamentals.	  	  In	  Georgia,	   for	  example,	   training	  has	  been	  conducted	   for	   several	  years	   on	   jury	   trial	   practice	   skills.	   	   As	   of	   now,	   there	   are	   no	   jury	  trials	   in	   Georgia,	   yet	   the	   training	   is	   in	   the	   U.S.-­‐style	   adversarial	  trial	  practice:	  voir	  dire,	  cross	  examination,	  handling	  exhibits,	  and	  closing	  jury	  arguments.	  	  This	  is	  the	  training	  that	  was	  provided	  to	  Georgian	   lawyers,	   none	   of	   whom	   had	   the	   slightest	   use	   for	   the	  skills	   taught	   nor	   the	   ethics	   principles	   that	   accompany	   them.	  	  During	   my	   own	   weeklong	   ethics	   training	   in	   Georgia	   in	   2009,	   I	  asked	   the	   audience	   for	   examples	   of	   lawyer	  misconduct	   in	   court	  settings.	   	   I	   hoped	   to	   explore	   their	   perceptions	   of	   in-­‐court	  misconduct	   by	   Georgian	   lawyers	   to	   facilitate	   our	   discussion	   of	  their	   code.	   	   Instead,	   in	   a	   turn	   around	   the	   table,	   they	   gave	   me	  example	   after	   example	   of	   jury	   trial	   lawyer	   misconduct,	   none	   of	  which	   can	   actually	   happen	   in	   their	   justice	   system,	   all	   of	   which	  they	  had	  been	  taught	  about	  by	  U.S.	  NGO	  trainers	  during	  the	  prior	  three	  years.	   	  They	  must	  have	  assumed	  that	  is	  what	  the	  American	  trainer	  would	   like	   to	   hear;	   in	   fact,	   I	   was	   asking	   the	   question	   to	  begin	   exploring	   their	   own	   system	   and	   the	   fundamentals	   of	  appropriate	  lawyer	  conduct	  within	  it.	  
IN	  THE	  WORKSHOP	  By	  contrast,	  during	  my	  day-­‐long	   training	  sessions	   for	  Kosovar	  judges,	  I	  focused	  not	  on	  the	  details	  of	  any	  particular	  code,	  theirs,	  ours,	  or	  any	  other,	  but	  rather	  on	  the	  core	  concept	  of	  impartiality.	  	  Given	   this	   single,	   central	   focus,	   and	   freed	   from	   covering	   the	  breadth	  of	   their	   code	  or	   the	  details	  of	   ours,	   I	   could	   create	   a	  day	  that	  would	  engage	  the	  judges	  (I	  hoped),	  challenge	  their	  intuitions,	  and	  leave	  them	  with	  lasting	  impressions.	  	  An	  old	  Chinese	  proverb	  states,	  “Tell	  me	  and	  I	  will	   forget.	   	  Show	  me	  and	  I	  will	  remember.	  	  Involve	  me	  and	  I	  will	  understand.”66	  	  I	  wanted	  a	  day	  with	  all	  three	  modes,	  with	  most	  of	  the	  attention	  on	  the	  last.	  	   66 Oft-­‐quoted	  Chinese	  proverb.	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  of	  the	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  was	  this:	  the	  basic	  training	  (provided	  by	   another	   trainer	   on	   other	   occasions)	   was	  meant	   to	   provide	   a	  broad,	  surface	  exposure	  to	  the	  codes	  that	  govern	  Kosovar	  judges	  and	   lawyers.	   	   The	   basic	   training	   was	   meant	   to	   familiarize	   the	  participants	  with	  the	  essential	  background	  and	  text	  of	  rules.	   	  My	  training	   would	   focus	   on	   a	   single,	   central	   topic	   and	   develop	   the	  participants’	   understanding	   with	   more	   interactive	   and	   more	  engaging	   teaching	   methods.	   	   The	   advanced	   training	   would	   use	  extensive	  hypotheticals	  and	  role	  plays,	  providing	  the	  participants	  with	   more	   than	   mere	   knowledge	   of	   the	   language	   of	   the	   rules.	  	  Rather,	   the	   participants	  would	   leave	   the	   advanced	   training	  with	  mental	   experience	   at	   identifying	   and	   solving	   daily	   issues	   that	  pose	  ethical	  difficulty.	  The	   standard	   day	   of	   advanced	   training	   itself	   proceeded	   as	  follows.	  	  I	  described	  the	  agenda	  and	  explained	  how	  the	  day	  would	  proceed,	   and	   that	   it	   would	   be	   somewhat	   different	   from	   ex	  
cathedra	   training	  that	  they	  might	  be	  more	  accustomed	  to.	   	   I	  said	  that	  contrary	  to	  their	  customary	  expectations,	  I	  would	  not	  talk	  at	  them	   for	   more	   than	   thirty	   minutes.	   	   This	   notion	   and	   phrasing	  always	  produced	  a	  curious	  look	  and	  then	  smiles	  as	  the	  translation	  made	  its	  way	  through	  the	  system	  and	  into	  their	  headphones.	  I	  gave	  a	  brief	   lecture	  on	   impartiality.	   	  Then,	   together	  with	   the	  participants	   and	  my	   co-­‐trainers,	   we	   discussed	   two	   of	   the	   seven	  prepared	   hypotheticals.	   	   The	   discussion	   was	   lively	   and	   induced	  many	   comments	   by	   nearly	   every	   participant.	   	   The	   first	  hypothetical	  was	  deceptively	   simple	   and	  designed	   to	  not	   raise	   a	  disqualifying	   impartiality	   concern.	   	   “Judge	   regularly	   hears	   cases	  involving	   Bank.	   	   Judge’s	   son	   currently	   has	   a	   loan	   application	  pending	   at	   Bank.”	   	   My	   impression	   is	   that	   participants	   are	  accustomed	   to	   outsiders	   always	   presenting	   unethical	   conduct	  through	   hypotheticals	   and	   I	   believe	   that	   this	   undermines	   the	  credibility	   of	   some	   trainers.	   	   The	   participants	   come	   to	   view	   the	  trainers	   as	   overly	   sensitive	   people	   for	   whom	   every	   scenario	   is	  grave.	   	   Instead,	  my	   first	   hypothetical	   did	   not	   pose	   disqualifying	  conduct,	   and	   the	   participants	   on	   most	   training	   days	   expressed	  such	   a	   view,	   sometimes	   in	   challenging	   voices,	   as	   if	   they	   were	  disagreeing	  with	  me	  when	  I	  had	  not	  yet	  commented	  on	  the	  hypo.	  	  (“How	  can	  our	   families	   live?	   	  Must	   they	  not	  buy	  groceries	  at	   the	  market	  if	  the	  market	  has	  cases	  in	  my	  court?	  	  Must	  my	  children	  not	  trade	  with	  a	  bank?	  	  Some	  judge	  must	  hear	  the	  bank’s	  cases.	  	  What	  of	  her	  children?”)	   	   I	   agreed	  with	   them	  and	   I	   think	  some	  of	   them	  expected	  me	   to	   say	  otherwise.	   	  My	   agreement	  was	  disarming	   to	  some	  of	  them	  who	  seemed	  not	  to	  contemplate	  that	  I	  would	  have	  given	  them	  a	  hypothetical	  that	  I	  did	  not	  think	  presented	  a	  serious	  ethical	  difficulty.	  	  From	  this	  place	  of	  agreement,	  I	  then	  asked	  what	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  facts	  might	  be	  added	  to	  the	  first	  hypothetical	  that	  would	  change	  it	  to	   one	   presenting	   disqualifying	   or	   more	   ethically	   problematic	  circumstances.	  	  The	  participants	  proposed	  several	  such	  additions.	  	  (“Perhaps	   if	   the	   bank	   gives	   the	   loan	   to	  my	   son	   on	   too	   favorable	  terms,	   hoping	   to	   gain	  my	   favor.	   	   Perhaps	   if	   I	   called	   the	   bank	   to	  pressure	   them	   to	   give	   the	   loan.	   	   Perhaps	   if	   the	   pending	   case	  involves	  my	  son’s	   loan.	   	  Perhaps	   .	   .	   .”)	   	  Then	  we	  discussed	  when	  and	  why	  these	  additions	  would	  be	  problematic.	  	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  technique	   does	   more	   than	   merely	   give	   an	   example	   of	   what	   is	  problematic.	   	   It	   allows	   the	   participants	   to	   see	   the	   differences	  between	  problematic	   and	   non-­‐problematic	   scenarios	   they	  might	  encounter.	  	  Rather	  than	  merely	  understanding	  what	  conduct	  falls	  on	   the	   problematic	   side	   of	   the	   line,	   they	   determine	   the	   line	   for	  themselves.	  The	  second	  hypothetical	  was	  also	  deceptively	  simple,	  and	  some	  participants	   said	   it	   was	   too	   simple	   to	   warrant	   their	   time	  discussing	   it.	   	   “A	   breach	   of	   contract	   case	   is	   pending	   in	   Judge’s	  court.	   	  A	  buyer	  of	  paint	  claims	  that	  the	  paint	  was	  of	  poor	  quality	  and	   damaged	   the	   wood	   surface	   to	   which	   it	   was	   applied.	   	   Judge	  had	   had	   the	   same	   thing	   happen	   to	   him	  with	   the	   same	   brand	   of	  paint.”	   But	   in	   reality,	   the	   participants	   disagreed	   about	   its	  disqualifying	   implications	   and	   the	   reasons	   supporting	   their	  opinions.	   	   By	   pointing	   out	   their	   disagreement	   as	   the	   discussion	  proceeded,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  even	  seemingly	  simple,	  everyday	   situations	   might	   produce	   differing	   opinions	   from	   the	  most	   experienced	   and	   wise	   judges	   in	   the	   country.	   	   That	  observation	   allowed	   me	   to	   then	   highlight	   and	   summarize	   the	  various	   points	   of	   view	   and	   to	   articulate	   why	   the	   better	   views	  were	  better	  suited	  to	  a	  fair	  and	  impartial	  judiciary.	  	  I	  forced	  some	  discussion	  underneath	  the	  opinions	  about	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	   this	  hypo.	   	   In	  particular,	   I	   got	   the	   group	   to	   identify	  what	  was	  the	  threat	  to	  impartiality.	  	  In	  this	  hypo,	  there	  are	  at	  least	  three:	  1.	   We	  want	   judges	   to	   come	   to	   disputes	  without	   prior	   factual	  knowledge.	   	  Here,	   the	   judge	   has	   used	   the	   same	  paint	  with	  the	  same	  result	  claimed	  by	  the	  plaintiff.	  2.	   We	  want	  judges	  to	  be	  free	  of	  prior	  bias	  against	  a	  party,	  and	  here	   the	   judge	   may	   harbor	   some	   ill	   feelings	   toward	   the	  paint	  company	  which	  has	  already	  harmed	  her.	  3.	   We	  want	  judges	  who	  have	  no	  personal	  stake	  in	  the	  outcome,	  and	  this	  judge	  may	  be	  setting	  some	  precedent	  for	  purposes	  of	   either	   her	   own	   later	   litigation,	   or	   pressuring	   the	   paint	  company	  to	  pay	  damages	  to	  the	  judge	  for	  her	  loss.	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  In	  the	  time	  remaining	  before	  lunch,	  I	  asked	  participants	  if	  they	  could	   identify	   any	   situations	   that	   had	   arisen	   in	   their	   courts	   on	  which	  they	  might	  like	  to	  seek	  the	  opinions	  of	  their	  colleagues.	  We	  adjourned	  for	  lunch,	  and	  following	  a	  usually	  too-­‐large	  meal	  and	   some	   conversation	   through	   translators,	   we	   returned	   to	  complete	  the	  day.	  After	  lunch,	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  excellent	  role	  playing	  of	  Drita	  Hajdari-­‐Peci	  and	  my	  co-­‐trainer	  Besim	  Kelmendi,	  we	  staged	  a	  role	  play	   regarding	  ex	  parte	   contact	   and	   corruption.	   	   In	   the	   role	  play,	  a	  judge	  (Besim)	  is	  sitting	  at	  a	  café	  on	  a	  lovely	  spring	  day.	  	  As	  he	  sits	  alone,	  he	  is	  approached	  by	  Drita,	  who	  greets	  him.	  	  Initially,	  he	   is	  not	  sure	  who	  she	   is,	  so	  she	  explains	   that	  she	  owns	  a	   travel	  company	  and	  reminds	  him	  of	  the	  group	  tour	  to	  the	  Adriatic	  coast	  he	  took	  with	  her	  company.	  	  He	  remembers	  the	  trip,	  of	  course,	  and	  then	   her.	   	   He	   invites	   her	   to	   join	   him.	   	   They	   have	   a	   nice	  conversation	  about	   the	   trip	  and	  she	   flatters	  him	  with	   talk	  of	  her	  other	  clients’	  pleasure	  at	  having	  him	  in	  their	  group.	  	  They	  seem	  to	  be	  enjoying	  each	  other’s	  company	  when	  she	  tells	  him	  that	  her	  son	  has	  been	  arrested	  and	  his	  case	  is	  pending	  in	  Besim’s	  court.	  	  He	  is	  not	   sure	  he	  knows	   the	  case,	  and	  she	  continues	  without	  pause	   to	  explain	  that	  her	  son	   is	   innocent	  and	  being	  manipulated	  by	  other	  young	  men.	  	  She	  carries	  on	  like	  this	  as	  long	  as	  he	  will	  let	  her,	  and	  then	   she	   asks	   if	   he	   can	   help	   her	   son.	   	   She	   gets	   an	   ambivalent,	  ambiguous	   answer	   and	   then	   turns	   the	   subject	   to	   Besim’s	  daughter,	  who	  has	  applied	   for	  a	   job	  at	  her	  company.	   	  She	  asks	   if	  he	  will	  be	  “grateful”	  if	  she	  hires	  his	  daughter.	  The	   participants,	   who	   had	   been	   whispering	   to	   one	   another,	  laughing	   and	   smiling	   during	   the	   role-­‐play,	   commented	   on	   what	  the	   judge	   had	   done	   and	   what	   he	   should	   have	   done	   differently.	  	  	   67 The	  remaining	  hypos	  are	  these,	  although	  it	  was	  rare	  to	  get	  to	  even	  the	  third	  or	  fourth.	  3.	   Judge	   is	   presiding	   over	   a	   traffic	   offense	  matter	   against	   a	   neighbor.	   	   Judge	  and	  the	  neighbor	  have	  recently	  had	  disputes	  because	  the	  neighbor	  plays	  loud	  music	  and	  hosts	  noisy	  parties.	  4.	   Judge’s	  son	  was	  killed	  during	  violence	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  Judge	  is	  now	  presiding	  over	  a	  criminal	  matter	  against	  a	  brother	  of	  the	  man	  who	  killed	  Judge’s	  son.	  5.	   Judge’s	   father	   lost	  his	  property	  during	   the	  1990s.	   	   Judge	   is	  now	  presiding	  over	  property	  restoration	  matters	  similar	  to	  his	  father’s	  case.	  6.	   Judge	   is	  presiding	  over	  an	  employment	  contract	  dispute.	   	  The	  employer	   is	  also	  the	  employer	  of	  Judge’s	  daughter.	  7.	   Judge	   is	   presiding	  over	   a	   traffic	   offense	  matter.	   	   The	  defendant	   is	   a	   social	  friend	  of	  Judge.	  	  They	  frequent	  the	  same	  café	  and	  see	  one	  another	  there	  almost	  daily.	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  They	  disagreed	  with	  one	  another.	   	  Besim	  explained	  what	  he	  had	  done	   as	   the	   judge	   in	   the	   role	   play	   and	  why.	   	   A	   very	   productive	  discussion	  ensued.	  On	   some	   occasions,	   a	   judge	   in	   the	   audience	   would	   ask	   if	   he	  could	  play	  Besim’s	  role	  and	  show	  how	  he	  would	  have	  responded	  to	   Drita’s	   entreaties.	   	   On	   other	   occasions,	   I	   would	   play	   Besim’s	  role	  for	  a	  second	  run	  through	  the	  role	  play.	   	  When	  I	  did	  this,	   the	  moment	   Drita	   turned	   attention	   to	   a	   case	   in	   my	   court,	   I	   would	  gently	  stop	  her,	  and	  say,	  “I	  am	  sorry,	  but	  one	  thing	  I	  cannot	  do	  as	  a	  judge	   is	  have	  any	  discussion	  of	   cases	   in	  my	  court,	  outside	  of	  my	  court.	   	   I	  must	   excuse	  myself,	   and	  hope	  you	  will	   enjoy	   the	   coffee	  and	   the	   lovely	   weather.”	   	   I	   would	   stand	   and	   depart	   with	   Drita	  protesting	  as	   I	  walked	  away.	   	  At	  one	  training,	   the	  group	  cheered	  my	   response.	   	  At	   another,	   they	  explained	   that	   they	   could	  not	  do	  such	   a	   thing	   because	   they	   would	   be	   labeled	   as	   rude	   in	   their	  community.	   	   I	   asked	   Drita	   what	   she	   would	   do	   if	   the	   judge	   had	  done	  as	  I	  did.	   	  She	  said	  she	  would	  tell	  her	   friends	  and	  neighbors	  that	   the	   judge	  was	  rude	   to	  her,	  despite	  my	  gentle	  way	  of	  ending	  the	   conversation.	   	   I	   asked	   the	   judges	   what	   would	   happen	   if	   all	  judges	   behaved	   this	   way,	   and	   they	   acknowledged	   that	   in	   their	  relatively	  small	  communities,	   it	  would	  not	  be	   long	  before	  people	  understood	  that	  this	  was	  simply	  what	  a	  judge	  must	  do.	  	  On	  some	  occasions,	   I	   would	   turn	   to	   Drita	   after	   the	   participants	   had	  exhausted	   their	   discussion	   and	   ask	   her	   why	   her	   character	  approached	  the	  judge	  at	  his	  café.	  	  She	  said	  she	  hoped	  to	  gain	  some	  advantage	  for	  her	  son.	   	   I	  asked	  if	  she	  believed	  she	  could	  exert	  as	  much	  influence	  if	  she	  had	  made	  the	  same	  arguments	  to	  the	  judge	  in	  court	  with	   the	  other	  side’s	   lawyer	  present.	   	  No,	  of	  course	  not,	  she	  said.	  	  So	  that	  is	  why	  we	  look	  askance	  at	  ex	  parte	  contact.	  	  That	  is	  why	  ex	  parte	  contact	  threatens	  impartiality.	  	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  experiential,	   role-­‐based	   methods,	   the	   lessons	   were	   understood	  with	  greater	  depth	  as	  the	  day	  progressed.	  Lessons	   about	   fundamental,	   transferable	   principles	   are	   the	  path	  to	  some	  harmony	  in	   lawyer	  and	  judicial	  ethics.	   	  From	  these	  beginnings,	   through	   a	   generation	   of	   lawyers	   who	   will	   work	   in	  global	   environments	   to	   a	   far	   greater	   extent	   than	   ours	   did,	   the	  details	  at	  the	  edges	  of	  ethics	  principles—confidentiality	  doctrine,	  truth-­‐telling,	  client-­‐getting,	  etc.—may	  or	  may	  not	  emerge.	  
CONCLUSION	  Cross-­‐border	   practice	   produces	   inevitable	   choice	   of	   law	  questions	   regarding	   lawyer	   ethics	   codes.	   	   Inevitably,	   norms	   of	  lawyer	   conduct	   vary	   from	   state	   to	   state	   and	   continent	   to	  continent.	   	  Uncertainty	  about	  norms	  of	  conduct	  pervades	   lawyer	  
70	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  47	  to	   lawyer	   interactions	   in	   cross-­‐border	   contexts.	   	   Undoubtedly,	  greater	   uniformity	   of	   rules	   and	   standards	   would	   produce	   some	  benefits,	   but	   such	   rule-­‐based	   uniformity	   would	   be	   illusory	   in	  practice	  given	  cultural	  differences.	   	  To	  the	  extent	  such	  beneficial	  uniformity	  could	  be	  implemented,	  the	  model	  of	  lawyer	  regulation	  should	  not	  be	   the	  U.S.	  model,	  despite	  recent	   initiatives	   to	  export	  U.S.-­‐style	   lawyer	   ethics	   models	   to	   emerging	   democracies	   and	  developing	  states.	  With	   insufficient	   care	   and	   thought	   and	   knowledge,	   the	   U.S.	  system	   of	   lawyer	   ethics	   is	   being	   exported.	   	   Granted,	   that	   some	  global	   lawyer	   ethics	   harmonization	   would	   be	   useful,	   the	   U.S.	  model	  may	  be	  the	  least	  likely	  to	  fit	  elsewhere.	   	  The	  reception	  for	  the	   U.S.	   model	   has	   been	   quite	   open,	   especially	   in	   emerging	  democracies	   that	   are	   much-­‐dependent	   on	   the	   United	   States	   in	  many	  ways.	   	  A	  Bangalore-­‐style	  process,	   open	  and	  multi-­‐cultural,	  holds	  greater	  promise	  for	  advancing	  the	  interest	  of	  lawyer	  ethics	  harmonization.	  
